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ASEAN’s Environmental Challenges and Non-Traditional  
Security Cooperation: Towards a Regional Peacekeeping 
Force? 
Henning Borchers1
► Borchers, H. (2014). ASEAN’s environmental challenges and non-traditional security cooperation: 
Towards a regional peacekeeping force? ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7(1), 5-20. 
This article reflects on the prospect for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and regional secu-
rity cooperation. I argue that progress on ‘soft’ security issues stands to facilitate a slow 
deepening of ‘hard’ security cooperation at the ASEAN level. Governments of ASEAN 
member states are still reluctant to develop a regional mechanism for conflict resolu-
tion, which they perceive to be a challenge to the norms of non-interference and state 
sovereignty. Yet, these norms are subject to dynamic shifts in the security environment 
that regional governments now have to manage. The establishment of mechanisms to ad-
dress politically less controversial non-traditional security issues such as environmental 
challenges stands to further develop and consolidate military-to-military ties and deepen 
political trust among member states. An ASEAN standby force for emergency response 
and disaster relief has become a politically acceptable initiative and could set the stage for 
the development of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. 
Keywords: ASEAN; HADR; Peacekeeping; Security Community; Security Cooperation

In diesem Beitrag wird die Möglichkeit einer ASEAN-Friedenstruppe und einer region-
alen Sicherheitskooperation betrachtet. Ich argumentiere, dass Fortschritte bei „weichen” 
Sicherheitsfragen eine stetige Vertiefung der „harten“ Sicherheitszusammenarbeit auf 
ASEAN-Ebene ermöglichen. Noch zögern die Regierungen der ASEAN-Staaten, einen re-
gionalen Konfliktlösungsmechanismus zu entwickeln, da sie diesen als Infragestellung 
der Normen der Nichteinmischung und der staatlichen Souveränität sehen. Diese Nor-
men hängen jedoch von dynamischen Veränderungen in der Sicherheitsumgebung ab, 
mit welchen die Regierungen konfrontiert sind. Die Einrichtung von Mechanismen um 
politisch weniger umstrittene, nicht-traditionelle Sicherheitsthemen anzugehen, wie z.B. 
Umweltherausforderungen, ist ein erster Schritt dahin, militärische Kooperationen weit-
er zu entwickeln, zu festigen sowie das politische Vertrauen zwischen den Mitgliedsta-
aten zu vertiefen. Eine ASEAN-Abruftruppe für Notfall- und Katastrophenhilfe ist bereits 
eine politisch akzeptable Initiative geworden. Dies könnte den Weg für die Entwicklung 
einer ASEAN-Friedenstruppe festlegen.
Schlagworte: ASEAN; HADR; Friedenssicherung; Sicherheitsgemeinschaft; Sicherheits-
kooperation
1 Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of 
the New Zealand Human Rights Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Indonesia proposed an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)2 
peacekeeping force towards the development of a regional mechanism for conflict 
resolution. The proposition was part of a comprehensive proposal for the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community (APSC), one of the three pillars3 of the ASEAN Com-
munity. At the time, several other ASEAN members rejected the idea of a region-
al force as ‘unnecessary’ or ‘too early’, with resistance largely credited to concerns 
over the norm of non-interference in member countries’ internal affairs (Bandoro, 
2004; Chongkittavorn, 2004; Kuah, 2004). Over the past decade, ASEAN advanced 
the APSC and military-to-military ties through preventive diplomacy and confidence 
building measures. Several member countries also developed their peacekeeping ca-
pabilities for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). The Association further adopted plans to es-
tablish a regional mechanism to address non-traditional security (NTS) challenges, 
including the development of a regional standby force that could be deployed in re-
sponse to environmental disasters. Plans to establish a regional mechanism for con-
flict resolution remain vague.
Focusing on the prospect of an ASEAN peacekeeping force, this article reflects on 
ASEAN’s approach to regional defense and security cooperation. I argue that prog-
ress on ‘soft’ security issues stands to facilitate a slow deepening of ‘hard’ security 
cooperation at the ASEAN level. ASEAN governments are still reluctant to develop a 
regional mechanism for conflict resolution, which they perceive to be a challenge to 
the norms of non-interference and state sovereignty. Yet, these norms are subject to 
dynamic shifts in the security environment that regional governments now have to 
manage. The establishment of mechanisms to address politically less sensitive NTS 
challenges such as environmental disasters stands to further consolidate military-to-
military ties among ASEAN member states through joint military exercises and thus 
deepen political trust. An ASEAN standby force for disaster preparedness and emer-
gency response in the region has become a politically acceptable initiative. This could 
set the stage for the development of an ASEAN peacekeeping force that could address 
more intricate political challenges such as domestic or regional conflicts.
Firstly, I will provide a historical outline of ASEAN’s approach to regional security, 
followed by a brief review of ASEAN security community building by means of an 
analysis of relevant literature and ASEAN policy papers. I will then analyze selected 
examples of regional peacekeeping initiatives and security cooperation. Lastly, I will 
discuss ASEAN’s approach to disaster preparedness and emergency response, and 
the implications related mechanisms could have for the development of an ASEAN 
peacekeeping force.
2 The ASEAN includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
3 The other two pillars of the ASEAN Community are the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Community (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009a).
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ASEAN’S APPROACH TO REGIONAL SECURITY
Security has always been a core concern of ASEAN. Following Indonesia’s armed 
opposition to the creation of Malaysia (konfrontasi) between 1963 and 1966, interstate 
war has been notably absent in Southeast Asia since ASEAN was established in 1967. 
The promotion of regional peace and stability is among the main objectives outlined 
in the Bangkok Declaration, the Association’s founding document. The declaration 
refers to security only in the context of external interference (ASEAN Declaration, 
1967). Yet, alongside interstate tensions, most of ASEAN’s founding members were 
also facing internal threats with potentially regional implications from the turbu-
lent processes of nation building and Cold War dynamics. Strengthening the state 
was ASEAN’s principal approach to manage internal security challenges, advance 
economic development, and maintain regional stability (Bellamy, 2004, p. 93; Rolls, 
2012, p. 128).
The Association has successfully maintained a stable interstate peace among its 
members based on the norms of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference 
in internal affairs, the non-use of force, and a consensus-based approach to decision-
making, collectively referred to as the ‘ASEAN Way’. The expansion of multilateral 
security and defense cooperation to a level “short of a formal military alliance” was 
also one of the options considered early on (Rolls, 2012, p. 129), but concerns over 
Cold War power rivalries prevented the formation of a military pact, which could 
have been perceived as a threat by communist regimes in the region (Acharya, 2000, 
p. 26). Moreover, most of the founding members already had de facto or formal al-
liances with Western powers that helped maintain regional stability. Security and 
defense cooperation at the ASEAN level was confined to bilateral relationships (Acha-
rya, 1991; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 19).
The norms entailed in the ‘ASEAN Way’ account for ASEAN’s strengths and weak-
nesses. Norms have a transformative impact as a determining factor in interstate in-
teractions and facilitate security community development (Adler & Barnett, 1998). 
ASEAN has been comprehensively and critically studied within the framework of se-
curity communities (Acharya, 1991, 2000; Bellamy, 2004; Caballero-Anthony, 2005; 
Haacke, 2005; Kuah, 2004; Tomotaka, 2008). The rules laid out in the ‘ASEAN Way’ 
have without doubt promoted shared values and a collective ASEAN identity among 
the region’s state-makers and bureaucratic elite, consolidating a level of mutual trust 
as well as deepening interstate practices through regular interaction. These process-
es have created “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people 
maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 30). 
Yet, internal conflicts with at times regional implications are prevalent in the region 
and have regularly raised questions as to the Association’s legitimacy, as it refrains 
from addressing regional conflicts and the poor human rights records of some re-
gional governments. The “cliché problem” (Sukma, 2010, p. 3) of non-interference 
is at the core of ASEAN’s ongoing struggle to effectively address regional security 
concerns as it obstructs collective efforts at conflict resolution in order to avoid con-
frontation.
ASEAN’s perspective on regional conflict resolution changed with the Associa-
tion’s engagement in the Cambodian conflict. The 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cam-
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bodia provided ASEAN, at the time including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand, the grounds for acting collectively towards the peaceful 
settlement of a regional dispute. To avert the perceived Vietnamese threat to Thai-
land’s sovereignty and regional stability, ASEAN advanced political, economic, and 
diplomatic initiatives, and urged and supported UN measures in order to effect Viet-
nam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, specifically through the Jakarta Informal Meet-
ings in 1988 and 1989 that helped facilitate the establishment of the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the deployment of UNTAC peace-
keeping forces from 1992 to 1993 (Sundararaman, 1997). This shared expression of 
the ‘ASEAN Way’, based on the commitment to diplomacy and consultation, was a 
formative experience for ASEAN that shaped the Association’s future approach to 
community building and regional peace and security (Bellamy, 2004, pp. 99–100; 
Caballero-Anthony, 2005, p. 259). Furthermore, Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand contributed military and civilian police personnel, marking UNTAC as 
ASEAN member states’ first contribution to a multilateral peacekeeping operation in 
the region.
In subsequent years, ASEAN had to redefine its role in managing regional security 
in a changing post-Cold War strategic and security environment. Security issues were 
increasingly raised in a range of extra-regional dialogues, highlighting the need for a 
multilateral approach. This led to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) in 1994, a platform that expanded ASEAN’s style of confidence building and 
preventive diplomacy to the wider Asia-Pacific region (Rolls, 2012, p. 131; Tomotaka, 
2008, p. 22). Yet, the Forum’s predominantly foreign ministry-affiliated participants, 
its emphasis of process over action, and slow pace towards developing a platform 
for preventive diplomacy were criticized by non-ASEAN members (Brandon, 2002; 
Tomotaka, 2008, p. 23). This gap was addressed through the establishment of the 
Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002, “Asia’s most prominent exercise in defence diplo-
macy” (Capie & Taylor, 2010, p. 359), which provides a forum for defense, security, and 
intelligence officials from the ARF countries to meet and discuss security issues per-
taining to the Asia-Pacific. A similar platform exclusive to ASEAN was yet to emerge. 
Regional repercussions of 9/11 and maritime security as well as pandemics and envi-
ronmental disasters further highlighted the need for a multilateral approach towards 
defense diplomacy and security cooperation at the ASEAN level.
THE ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY
The notion of establishing a Southeast Asian security community to facilitate po-
litical and security cooperation has been at the heart of ASEAN’s concept of regional 
order since its early years (Acharya, 1991, p. 161). In 2003, Indonesia advanced a set of 
propositions suggesting a range of measures towards the establishment of an ASEAN 
Security Community as one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community. Indonesia, 
having emerged from the crippling impacts of the Asian financial crisis and the socio-
political tensions this had created domestically, was eager to again project its claim for 
regional leadership both to the Association’s other members and to an international 
community that welcomed the norms and values Jakarta espoused with its proposal 
(“Indonesia Proposes”, 2004; Kuah, 2004). Following East Timor’s referendum and 
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independence, which had been facilitated by an Australian-led international force, it 
likely was also in Jakarta’s interest to develop a regional mechanism to avert further 
international interference in domestic and regional affairs. Australia’s leadership in 
East Timor had soured the relationship between Jakarta and Canberra for several 
years following the intervention. Ongoing conflicts in Aceh, where the Megawati ad-
ministration had declared martial law in 2003, and Papua also highlighted the need 
to establish a mechanism to manage domestic problems regionally. The tenets of the 
‘ASEAN Way’, which continue to determine relations among member states and that 
prioritize dialogue over confrontation, would be preferable to the embarrassment 
caused by the intervention of extra-regional forces.
Other ASEAN governments were, however, apprehensive of Indonesia’s projec-
tion of what was perceived as a “democracy agenda” that challenged the principles 
enshrined in the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Sukma, 2008, p. 138). In order to address these con-
cerns while maintaining core elements of the original proposal, Indonesia proposed 
the establishment of peacekeeping centers in the region to build regional capabili-
ties for UN-led peacekeeping missions and disaster relief. These objectives were bet-
ter aligned with the less contentious dimension of regional non-traditional security 
cooperation, acknowledging that peacekeeping missions increasingly have to meet 
a wider range of objectives, including HADR (Uesugi, 2004). While noting the re-
gion’s need to develop its capacity for conflict prevention and resolution, the revised 
proposal refrained from highlighting the potential of regional peacekeepers for the 
purposes of ‘hard’ security cooperation within ASEAN. Sugeng Raharjo, a former In-
donesian foreign ministry official, suggested that “the wording was changed but the 
spirit is the same” (“Indonesia Modifies”, 2004). The revised proposal was approved in 
the same year at the ninth ASEAN Summit. By signing the Bali Concord II, member 
states committed to its principal components of norm setting, conflict prevention, 
conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building, and the establishment of an ASEAN 
Political-Security Community (APSC) by 2020 (ASEAN Concord II, 2003).4
Through the Bali Concord II, ASEAN outlined its commitment to ‘comprehensive 
security’ and enhanced defense cooperation, though within the framework of the 
‘ASEAN Way’ to inform interstate relations. The norm of non-interference substan-
tially shaped member states’ initial resistance to the original proposal and Jakarta’s 
response as the Bali Concord II reaffirmed ASEAN member countries’ “rights to 
lead their national existence free from outside interference in their internal affairs” 
(ASEAN Concord II, 2003, p. 3). This perpetuation of ASEAN’s core norms raised the 
question of whether the initiative really was “more of the same” (Rolls, 2012, p. 132). 
Any development and implementation of new mechanisms was further set to move 
“at a pace comfortable to all”, which confirmed the tradition of the lowest common 
denominator in ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making culture (ASEAN Con-
cord II, 2003, p. 3).
The Vientiane Action Programme, which was adopted the following year (2004), 
aimed to address a wide range of security issues by initiating the gradual institu-
tionalization of confidence building measures, multilateral security dialogues, and 
mechanisms (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004b). Multilateral dialogues such as the ASEAN 
4 The timeline for establishing the APSC was later changed to 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009b, p. 1).
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Defence Minister’s Meeting (ADMM, since 2006) and the ADMM-Plus (since 2010) 
have since become important regional platforms for ASEAN member states and dia-
logue partners to advance security cooperation and defense diplomacy.5 As the high-
est defense mechanism within ASEAN, the ADMM is a significant step in ASEAN 
security regionalism towards the APSC as it promotes “regional peace and stability 
through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security” by means of military-to-
military interaction (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).
Despite restated commitments to establishing an ASEAN mechanism for regional 
conflict resolution, progress towards this goal remains slow. The objective of estab-
lishing “regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and stability” was first 
expressed in the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme (p. 8). It was reiterated in the 
2009 APSC Roadmap (p. 14). In 2011, defense ministers agreed to establish an ASEAN 
Peacekeeping Training Centre Network to facilitate planning, training, and exchange 
of experience in order “to contribute to peacekeeping efforts in the world” (Indone-
sian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, cited in “Defense Ministers Discuss”, 
2011; ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting [ADMM], 2011b). Concrete steps to estab-
lish a mechanism for the management of regional security are yet to materialize. Re-
cent territorial spats between Thailand and Cambodia as well as the conflict between 
Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists in Myanmar highlight the need for such a 
mechanism and have raised renewed calls for an ASEAN peacekeeping force (“Asean 
Peacekeepers”, 2012; Pitsuwan, 2011).
TOWARDS AN ASEAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE?
ASEAN member states are yet to agree on a uniform view of defense cooperation 
that could make a regional force possible. The idea of some form of military arrange-
ment, even a “joint command”, had been raised several times throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, yet it failed to receive the support of ASEAN leaders (Acharya, 1991, p. 161). 
Indonesia’s proposal for an ASEAN peacekeeping force that could be deployed to help 
resolve regional and internal conflicts met with resistance from the representatives 
of several regional governments, who at the time considered Jakarta’s proposal for an 
ASEAN Security Community a “blatant and unacceptable bid to reassert itself over 
the rest of the region” (Wain, 2004). Vietnam’s foreign minister considered the idea 
of a regional force “too early” and argued that the region’s political and military poli-
cies were not sufficiently compatible for the level of cooperation required for such an 
initiative (Acharya, 2005, p. 149). Possibly in view of the Association’s economic pre-
rogatives, Singapore’s foreign minister argued that ASEAN was neither a security nor 
a defense organization and that the grouping was the “wrong entity to play a peace-
keeping role” (Acharya, 2005, p. 149; Kuah, 2004, p. 4). Thailand’s foreign affairs min-
ister rejected the idea as unnecessary and argued that there were no conflicts in the 
region that would justify the mobilization of an ASEAN force (Kuah, 2004, p. 2). The 
resistance of regional governments to this level of ‘hard’ security cooperation was 
indicative of the latent antagonism that exists among members of the Association. 
5 The ADMM-Plus includes ASEAN dialogue partners Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States.
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Notwithstanding efforts towards community building, mutual distrust and competi-
tion within ASEAN endure. The several territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
involving Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines as well as border disputes between 
Thailand and Cambodia, among others, underline this complexity (Acharya, 1991, pp. 
173–174, 2000, p. 128; “ASEAN, Preventive Diplomacy”, 2011; Bandoro, 2004; Sukma, 
2011). Faith in the Association’s conflict resolution procedures has been modest at 
best, evident in the yet to be utilized High Council mandated in the 1976 Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that was again put forward in the APSC (Tomotaka, 
2008, p. 21). The absence of a regional mechanism for conflict resolution is particu-
larly noteworthy in view of the disproportional ratio of armed conflict in Southeast 
Asia to the number of peacekeeping operations in the region (Helmke, 2009, p. 4).
The response to Indonesia’s propositions also indicated regional governments’ 
ongoing commitment to the norm of non-interference (Bandoro, 2004; Chongkit-
tavorn, 2004; Kuah, 2004). ASEAN member states’ initial lack of response to the 
post-referendum violence in East Timor highlighted the significance of this norm in 
interstate relations in the region, though once Indonesia conceded to UN interven-
tion, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand did eventually deploy per-
sonnel to the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and to 
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
The norm of non-interference continues to impact on regional affairs, but some 
change is underway. Rizal Sukma from the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, who was involved in drafting the 2003 proposal, noted that 
Indonesia had failed to address the question of non-interference in view of its pro-
posed mechanisms for conflict resolution and peace building (Khalik, 2003). Sukma 
asserted that Indonesia did not want to question the principle, though he claimed a 
more flexible interpretation was necessary in order to address internal security prob-
lems within the region. This episode once again demonstrated the intricate balance 
norm entrepreneurs in ASEAN have to maintain between the ‘ASEAN Way’ and ef-
forts to realign these norms to address emerging issues in a changing security en-
vironment. Prior to Indonesia’s proposal, Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim and Thailand’s 
Surin Pitsuwan endeavored to adjust ASEAN’s founding principles. Their concepts of 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘flexible engagement’, respectively, met with consid-
erable resistance at the time (Acharya, 2005, p. 150; Bellamy, 2004, p. 97; Bellamy & 
Drummond, 2011, p. 187; Haacke, 2005). Acharya thus asserts, “the most significant 
barrier to peace operations in Asia … is normative” (Acharya, 2005, p. 149). These 
reactions also explain the lingering skepticism towards the global ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ (R2P) debate. Alongside its premise to address human security in the con-
text of government atrocities, R2P has also been invoked to legitimize the forcible 
delivery of humanitarian assistance without a government’s consent in response to 
the initial resistance of Myanmar’s government to accept foreign assistance following 
cyclone Nargis, and it has been argued that the principle is making some normative 
headway in the region (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011, p. 263).
Following Indonesia’s proposal, one can discern growing support for the notion 
of a regional peacekeeping capability as several ASEAN members developed their 
peacekeeping capacities. Primarily, regional governments value the participation in 
multilateral peace operations under UN auspices, as this helps advance their interna-
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tional standing, multilateral diplomacy, and defense capabilities. Since 2003, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have substantially increased their contributions 
of police, military experts, and troops to UNPKO. Jakarta has invested considerably 
in the country’s peacekeeping capacities as Indonesia intends to be among the top 
ten contributing countries to UNPKO by 2020 (Luftia, 2012). Also the Philippines 
have more than tripled contributions to UNPKO since 2003 and numbers of troop 
deployment, in particular, have sharply increased (UN Peacekeeping Statistics, 2013).
While these developments are less pronounced in other ASEAN countries, there 
is a discernable regional trend to advance peacekeeping capacities. Singapore’s con-
tribution has been modest since the country deployed several hundred peacekeepers 
to UNPKO in East Timor. Brunei started deploying modest numbers of peacekeepers 
in 2006 (UN Peacekeeping Statistics, 2013). Cambodia has been a steady contributor 
to UNPKO since 2004. Thailand’s contributions dropped following the 2006 military 
coup, increased again from 2010, but dropped again sharply in mid-2012. In 2010, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand also established the 
ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Association, a first step towards the establishment of 
the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network that was endorsed by the ADMM in its 
2011 Joint Declaration. The network’s purpose is “aimed to promote and enhance 
cooperation among defence and armed forces within ASEAN” to leverage member 
states’ peacekeeping competencies and capabilities, which would benefit both UN-
led operations and regional initiatives (ADMM, 2011a).
Signaling a significant shift in attitude towards the UN, Vietnam first expressed 
support for UNPKO in 2006. Hanoi has yet to contribute peacekeepers to UNPKO, 
which might be due to political opposition as much as capacity (“Vietnam Mulls Par-
ticipation”, 2006). In developing its peacekeeping capacity, Vietnam is also deepen-
ing bilateral relationships with extra-regional partners (“Australia Expands”, 2012; 
“Vietnam, Bangladesh”, 2012). Myanmar and Laos are yet to participate in this de-
velopment. But the shift is obvious. Carlyle Thayer of the Australian Defence Force 
Academy thus proposed that “there is normative pressure building up regionally in 
support of peacekeeping under U.N. auspices” (“Vietnam Mulls Participation”, 2006).
Furthermore, these developments are paralleled by a gradual reinterpretation of 
the norm of non-interference. The language of the 2009 APSC Roadmap entails a 
subtle shift from the 2007 ASEAN Charter, which had already indicated a more flex-
ible interpretation of non-interference vis-à-vis the achievement of collective goals in 
economic affairs, but also increasingly in view of regional security (Bellamy & Drum-
mond, 2011, p. 189). The Roadmap makes no mention of the norm of non-interference, 
a notable omission in view of its security context. Instead, it emphasizes the objective 
to “strengthen efforts in maintaining respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
unity of ASEAN Member States [by] addressing threats and challenges that may af-
fect the territorial integrity of ASEAN Member States including those posed by sepa-
ratism” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009a, p. 13). This objective reflects Indonesia’s original 
proposal to develop ‘standby arrangements’ for a peacekeeping force as a “maximum 
security response … that could one day help settle disputes such as those in Aceh and 
the southern Philippines” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004a). Two regional missions high-
light the potential of this arrangement. In Aceh, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand supplied approximately 40 percent of the military observers 
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and civilian monitors to the 2005–2006 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) that was 
established by the European Union, and which facilitated the implementation of the 
2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding.6 Yet, the security component of the 
International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Central Mindanao comes closest to the idea 
of a regional force.7 The IMT was established in 2004 under the Government of the 
Philippines-Moro Islamic Liberation Front Coordinating Committee on the Cessa-
tion of Hostilities (CCCH) and has since been credited with successfully reducing the 
number of ceasefire violations (Bendahara & Au, 2012). In October 2012, in view of a 
peace agreement that was signed in early 2014, a Philippine government representa-
tive raised the idea of an international peacekeeping force through the existing IMT 
structure to facilitate demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of the 
armed forces of the MILF (Arguillas, 2012). The mission’s success is also due to the fa-
vorable conditions of the constellation. Both Malaysia and Indonesia, who contribute 
a substantial share of the peacekeepers, have played significant roles in mediating the 
conflicts in Central Mindanao since the 1990s.
The development of regional peacekeeping capacities will further benefit from 
initiatives at the level of ASEAN-centered multilateral mechanisms such as the ARF 
and the ADMM-Plus. At the 2010 ADMM-Plus meeting in Hanoi, defense ministers 
agreed to establish a Peacekeeping Working Group to identify capability gaps as 
well as opportunities for collaboration to enhance member states’ contributions to 
peacekeeping operations (Department of National Defense, Republic of the Philip-
pines, 2012). Member countries of the ARF have conducted annual Peacekeeping Ex-
pert Meetings since 2007, focusing on capacity building, civil-military cooperation, 
and regional cooperation in peacekeeping, post-conflict peace building, and HADR 
(ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF], 2010).
The convergence of peacekeeping and aspects of NTS and HADR creates op-
portunities to expand military cooperation. The APSC Roadmap instructs member 
states to create a “cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared respon-
sibility for comprehensive security … which goes beyond the requirements of tradi-
tional security but also takes into account non-traditional aspects vital to regional 
and national resilience” (p. 11). Regional cooperation on some of the less contentious 
issues of NTS such as environmental disasters can thus facilitate military-to-military 
ties through joint training, operations, and exercises as well as the development of 
a regional standby arrangement for disaster relief. As such, the non-traditional se-
curity agenda could become the platform on which to advance traditional security 
cooperation.
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY: ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES
The NTS agenda advances the intractable debate on normative realignments as it 
questions the modus operandi of the ‘ASEAN Way’, which hitherto had been framed 
within traditional security concerns. Since the late 1990s, ASEAN had to manage a 
6 Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Singapore provided monitors to the mission alongside 
the European Union, Norway, and Switzerland.
7 At the time of writing, the IMT’s Security Component included 11 peacekeepers from Malaysia, 15 
peacekeepers from Brunei, 15 peacekeepers from Indonesia, and two peacekeepers from Norway.
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range of security issues, such as transnational crime and terrorism as well as natu-
ral and man-made environmental disasters, which initiated a gradual shift towards 
a more qualified form of sovereignty that allowed some degree of interference at 
the regional level. Sukma (2008, p. 147) argues that while the doctrine of non-in-
terference continues to remain relevant, it needs to be interpreted in the context of 
member states’ interdependence and their vulnerability to transboundary issues and 
spillover effects of domestic events in member countries. Bellamy and Drummond 
(2011, p. 196) assert that “many Southeast Asian states are moving away from the tra-
ditional notion of sovereignty … towards accepting a localised variant of sovereignty 
as responsibility” that allows for criticism of domestic policies and limited diplomatic 
pressure in the event of humanitarian crises. Also Caballero-Anthony and Haywood 
(2010, p. 7) note a gradual shift in attitudes towards the principles of state sover-
eignty and non-interference, with ‘regional’ security concerns at times outweighing 
concerns over ‘interference’. They conclude that “the ‘ASEAN way’ itself is not an 
entirely static concept and what is considered interference in the domestic affairs of 
a country is an ever-widening notion” (Caballero-Anthony & Haywood, 2010, p. 5).
These dynamics became evident in ASEAN’s – albeit belated – response to cy-
clone Nargis that devastated parts of Myanmar in 2008. ASEAN, long criticized for 
its hands-off approach to the Burmese regime, raised concerns over human security 
and eventually responded despite initial concerns over the prerogative of non-in-
terference. Nargis triggered the largest humanitarian operation ever coordinated by 
ASEAN, who successfully mediated between the Burmese regime and international 
aid donors, diminishing fears of political intervention in order to manage the hu-
manitarian crisis (Emmerson, 2008a, p. 45). Although critics pointed out the non-
political nature of ASEAN’s involvement, some observers argued that the cyclone 
“transformed Myanmar from ASEAN’s embarrassment into its opportunity” (Em-
merson, 2008a, p. 45) as the Association’s relationship with the regime became an 
asset in the aftermath of the disaster (see also Bellamy & Drummond, 2011, p. 191).
The experience highlighted the need for more formal mechanisms to facilitate 
a coordinated regional response to such disasters. It further demonstrated the role 
ASEAN militaries could play in assisting relief efforts (Gunawan, 2008) and illustrat-
ed the significance of cooperation with non-state actors as well as civil-military co-
ordination. This multi-faceted approach widens the security discourse in the region 
towards a pluralistic response to security challenges, further eroding the Westpha-
lian logic of state-centered security (Emmerson, 2008b, p. 147; Sukma, 2008). Then- 
ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, who was credited with putting pressure 
on Myanmar to cooperate, later proclaimed, “this is the New ASEAN – a commu-
nity that puts people at the centre of concern” (Pitsuwan, 2008, p. xx). The response 
to Nargis highlighted ASEAN’s efforts at “working around the sensitivities to exter-
nal interference and avoiding charges of intrusion by emphasising the cooperative 
character of the NTS agenda in which sovereignty is not trumped or superseded, but 
rather, pooled” (Caballero-Anthony, 2008, p. 207). Since Nargis, this approach has 
been further institutionalized.
The establishment of a legally binding ASEAN disaster mitigation mechanism 
draws from the lessons learned, but progress remains slow. The ASEAN Agreement 
on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) was designed as a 
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“proactive regional framework for cooperation, coordination, technical assistance, 
and resource mobilisation in all aspects of disaster management” (ASEAN Agreement 
on Disaster Management and Emergency Response [AADMER], 2005). The process 
was initiated several weeks before the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and ASEAN For-
eign Ministers ratified AADMER in July 2005. It took more than four years for the 
agreement to come into effect, however, and overall progress has been criticized as 
too slow in view of the frequent disasters in the region (Amul, 2012).
The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Man-
agement (AHA Centre), established in November 2011 and based in Jakarta, serves as 
the hub for coordinated disaster response under the mandate of the AADMER. The 
Centre faced its first major challenge with typhoon Haiyan, which devastated parts 
of the central Philippines in November 2013. While the Centre had been monitoring 
the movement of the typhoon and deployed a field team to the region prior to the ty-
phoon’s landfall to coordinate relief efforts, some observers were critical of ASEAN’s 
response, noting that regional relief efforts were coordinated bilaterally, rather than 
through ASEAN (Graham, 2013). A week after landfall, there was still no clear chain 
of command to coordinate relief efforts, a gap that the Centre would have been man-
dated to fill. Further, the naval relief effort, a significant dimension of HADR in a pre-
dominantly maritime region, was being led by extra-regional states, with ASEAN na-
vies mostly absent (Graham, 2013). Thailand’s foreign minister Surapong commented 
that “a quick response team is needed for ASEAN, the 10 countries have human re-
sources and enough equipment, so it is time to share and cooperate” (Graham, 2013).
The AADMER is also the most significant step yet towards a more functional level 
of security cooperation. Article 9 of the AADMER mandates the establishment of an 
ASEAN Standby Arrangement for HADR deployed on a voluntary basis and based on 
the state’s capabilities. Under the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Oper-
ating Procedures (SASOP), the AHA Centre now co-organizes the multi-level ASEAN 
Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) that began in 
2005, where ASEAN member states practice, assess, and review the readiness of di-
saster emergency response mechanisms (Pacific Disaster Center, 2013). ARDEX-13, 
which was hosted by Vietnam shortly before typhoon Haiyan, was the first opportu-
nity to test the operational capability of the AHA Centre.
In the 2011 ADMM declaration, defense ministers adopted plans to use military 
assets and capacities for HADR operations (ADMM, 2011b, p. 4). The establishment 
of the standby arrangement is perceived as a matter of urgency that requires the ac-
celeration of “the effective operations of the ASEAN military in HADR operations 
regionally and internationally … to minimise loss to live and property due to natu-
ral and man-made disasters, while respecting the sovereignty of the affected State” 
(ADMM, 2011b, p. 4 and Annex D, p. 2). Indonesia and Singapore co-hosted the first 
ASEAN HADR Table-Top Exercise (ASEAN HADR TTX) in July 2011 as a step towards 
practical cooperation of ASEAN militaries. The second HADR TTX was co-hosted by 
Brunei and Singapore in 2013 in an effort to strengthen ASEAN centrality especially 
in the context of military-to-military cooperation as well as the coordination with 
civil HADR mechanisms such as the AHA Centre (Wood, 2013).
Progress towards the standby arrangement has been limited to the ongoing 
identification of member states’ assets and capacities. The implementation of the 
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AADMER work programme is the primary responsibility of the member states, which 
have to develop the policy and legal framework at the national level to facilitate the 
establishment of necessary structures and mechanisms for implementation, coor-
dination, and enforcement (ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, 2010, p. 
74). Without a definite timeframe, these processes will take time. Voluntary contri-
butions by ASEAN member states, “preferably on a regular basis”, along with con-
tributions from dialogue partners are meant to finance the implementation of the 
AADMER work programme (AADMER, 2012). Without secure funding, the viability 
of the mechanism cannot be ascertained. Also the voluntary nature of the standby 
arrangement should not surprise critics of ASEAN’s modus operandi. The ‘ASEAN 
Way’ still sets the pace for the development of a regional mechanism that provides 
the clearest outline yet for a regional force.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of this mechanism, progress made towards 
regional responses to environmental, or ‘soft’, security challenges may stand to fa-
cilitate the emergence of a collective response to ‘hard’ security challenges, though 
a regional mechanism for conflict resolution is unlikely to be realized in the near 
future. ASEAN’s preference for a ‘soft’, or lower, degree of institutionalization means 
that the normative realignment currently underway will take time to manifest itself 
in institutions and practices. The prevalence of NTS threats to national and regional 
security will continue to highlight the need to accelerate this development.
To adequately address current security challenges will require regional govern-
ments to sacrifice a degree of their sovereignty. As the norm of sovereignty as respon-
sibility as a concession to the primacy of individual human rights and security gains 
traction (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011, p. 186), one can be hopeful that the conflicts 
that have festered under the protective fold of the ‘ASEAN Way’ for decades and that 
have led to many ‘man-made disasters’ across the region will be subject to closer re-
gional scrutiny in the near future. The establishment of a regional force as a conflict 
resolution mechanism is still eyed with caution, as it is perceived to be a challenge to 
the norms that help uphold regional peace and stability. Yet, a regional force could 
also be a powerful statement consolidating the level of trust and the sense of com-
munity within ASEAN. This may allow for an open dialogue also on those conflicts 
that could, if further ignored by regional governments, adversely affect communi-
ty building towards a “peaceful and stable Southeast Asia where each nation is at 
peace with itself”, the very purpose that is at the core of ASEAN’s existence (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 1997).
CONCLUSION
I have argued that ASEAN’s cooperation on some non-traditional security chal-
lenges stands to facilitate the deepening of traditional security cooperation. The As-
sociation has made considerable progress towards adapting to the changing security 
environment, most notably in the area of defense diplomacy and the management of 
non-traditional, specifically environmental, security challenges. Military cooperation 
within ASEAN remains limited, as indicated by the lack of progress towards a re-
gional mechanism for conflict resolution, but plays an increasing role in HADR. Thus 
far, commitments to a regional mechanism for conflict resolution are not designed to 
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move beyond the level of political rhetoric. The main obstacle has been the question 
of whether and under what conditions ASEAN’s approach to security should include 
a right to intervene in a member country’s internal affairs. The norms framing South-
east Asian security cooperation are only slowly succumbing to the changing security 
environment regional governments have to face as they have to consider whether 
and when to prioritize human security over state security and external versus inter-
nal security threats (Emmerson, 2008a, p. 6). ASEAN’s response to a range of NTS 
issues in recent years, such as the cyclone Nargis, suggests that these new challenges 
have contributed to a realignment of the ‘ASEAN Way’.
ASEAN governments have come to realize that multilateral defense cooperation 
is necessary in order to effectively address NTS challenges. ASEAN could benefit from 
a deepening of regional defense cooperation, as it consolidates confidence among its 
members. The objective of establishing an HADR standby force is encouraging. The 
nascent initiative seen in the network of national peacekeeping training centers pro-
vides a framework for advancing joint initiatives that could well include all ASEAN 
members in the future. The security component of the peacekeeping operation in 
Central Mindanao is a positive example of an initiative that is already predominant-
ly regional. These initiatives indicate that the notion of a regional force, which was 
outright rejected ten years ago, is slowly gaining traction in the regional normative 
framework. The ‘soft’ institutionalization of security and defense cooperation is at a 
pace observers might criticize as too slow in view of the urgent needs faced by many 
disaster- and crisis-struck communities in the region. However, acknowledging the 
achievements of ASEAN to date, an ASEAN peacekeeping force might yet be a not-
too-distant possibility. Whether it would work towards resolving some of ASEAN’s 
long-standing internal conflicts or whether it would serve to ward off international 
scrutiny of ASEAN’s at times questionable approach to protecting its citizens’ human 
rights remains to be seen.

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